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INTERAGENCY MERGER REVIEW IN LABOR MARKETS 
HIBA HAFIZ*
As empirical evidence of labor market concentration mounts, 
academics and policymakers advanced proposals to challenge or reverse 
its effects on workers’ wages and labor market options. Prominent among 
these is more aggressive review of the labor market effects of mergers by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). This Essay argues for an alternative intervention: because placing 
exclusive jurisdiction over the labor market effects of mergers in the DOJ 
and FTC will be fundamentally limited for historical, doctrinal, 
institutional, and expertise-based reasons and as a matter of prophylactic 
policy, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) should have 
concurrent jurisdiction to review and approve mergers that the DOJ or 
FTC determine will substantially or moderately increase labor market 
concentration in a relevant labor market under a “public interest” 
standard.
The Essay first outlines the limitations of existing proposals to 
regulate labor market effects exclusively through the antitrust agencies’ 
merger review. Second, it catalogs and evaluates the range of interagency 
coordination between the antitrust and regulatory agencies on merger 
reviews, including but not limited to the antitrust agencies’ concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Federal Communications Commission. This overview 
documents how, in a significant number of industries outside of labor 
markets, regulatory agencies review and condition mergers under a 
“public interest” standard and based on their industry-specific knowledge 
and expertise. That deeper background of shared interagency jurisdiction 
contextualizes and supports the proposed extension of concurrent 
jurisdiction to labor agencies in merger reviews with labor market effects. 
Finally, the Essay provides recommendations for how the Board’s 
concurrent jurisdiction could operate to integrate its expertise into the 
evaluation of post-merger labor market effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Evidence of labor market concentration, mergers’ suppressive effects 
on wages, employer collusion through wage-fixing and no-poaching 
agreements, rampant use of non-compete agreements, and broader labor 
market failures resulting in employer buyer power has drawn sharp 
attention to labor market regulation by antitrust scholars and enforcers, 
creating an unprecedented reform effort to apply antitrust law to 
employers’ conduct.1 Proposals range from more aggressive civil and 
criminal enforcement against wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements2 to 
expanding the Sherman Act’s monopolization standards to incorporate 
anticompetitive employer conduct.3 Most prominently, however, they 
concentrate on more thorough Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) merger review to reduce labor market 
concentration and prevent its unilateral and coordinated effects—reduced 
hiring resulting in under-, mis-, and unemployment, artificially suppressed 
 1.  See Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Alexander 
Colvin & Heidi Shierholz, Noncompete Agreements (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements/; David Arnold, Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Local Labor Market Concentration, and Worker Outcomes (Oct. 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3476369; Eric Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to 
Covenants Not to Compete in Employment Contracts (Sept. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3453433 [https://perma.cc/8QZ7-62C9]; José Azar 
et al., Estimating Labor Market Power (Sept. 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456277; Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 94 INDIANA L.J. 1031 (2019); Suresh Naidu & Eric Posner, 
Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law (Jan. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365374 [https://perma.cc/ZE5S-2ZJG]; Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner, Why 
Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335174 [https://perma.cc/P39V-48FC] [hereinafter Marinescu & Posner, 
Why Has Antitrust]; BRIAN CALLACI, Vertical Restraints and the Creation of the Fissured Workplace,
in THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CREATION OF A FISSURED WORKPLACE: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING 
45-72 (2019); Evan Starr, THE USE, ABUSE, AND ENFORCEABILITY OF NON-COMPETE AND NO-POACH
AGREEMENTS (2019), https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Non-Competes-2.20.19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G3JS-E4FR]; Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 536, 556-60 (2018); Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner, A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust 
Protection Against Labor Market Monopsony (Roosevelt Inst. Working Paper No. 11, 419, 2018), 
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/RI_ ProposalToEnhanceAntitrustProtection_ 
workingpaper_11419-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GW8-H5DD] [hereinafter Marinescu & Posner, 
Proposal to Enhance]; José Azar et al., Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from Online 
Vacancy Data (IZA DP Working Paper No. 11379, 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11379.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GPY-9G8J]; David Berger et al., LABOR MARKET POWER (2018), 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed018/170.html [https://perma.cc/CLU8-XDLC]; Arindrajit Dube et al., 
Monopsony in Online Labor Markets (NBER Working Paper No. w24416 (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3143341 [https://perma.cc/S72L-8PE5]; Alan 
Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector
(NBER Working Paper No. 24831, 2018). 
 2.  See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3 (2016). 
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compensation, employer collusion, distributive impacts on increasing 
inequality, and more—to better ensure robust labor market competition.4
While fruitful, these proposals focus exclusively on reforming 
antitrust agencies’ merger review of labor market effects, applying current 
antitrust standards to labor market effects or slightly clarifying those 
standards to the particular circumstances of buy-side merger effects in 
labor markets. In so doing, they do not sufficiently contend with the 
limitations of exclusive antitrust agency jurisdiction as a historical, 
doctrinal, institutional, and expertise-based matter as well as a matter of 
prophylactic policy. They also ignore the benefits of interagency labor 
market regulation in contributing to long-term labor market health and 
reinforcing antitrust merger policy. 
To overcome these limitations of the current reform agenda, this Essay 
proposes integrating labor antitrust merger enforcement with labor law 
enforcement through interagency merger review between the antitrust 
agencies and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”). 
Specifically, if the antitrust agency’s screening of larger mergers through 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino merger review process predicts post-merger labor 
market concentration levels as “moderately” or “highly concentrated,” the 
NLRB’s review and sign-off should be required for merger approval. In 
conducting its review, the Board would apply a “public interest” standard 
to evaluate whether the merger could result in harms substantially 
frustrating or impairing the objectives or implementation of the NLRA, 
including ensuring equal bargaining power between employers and 
employees, and would consider a range of industry- and firm-specific 
evidence for properly benchmarking impacts of the merger on relative 
bargaining power and productivity-maximizing wages. In doing its merger 
assessment, the Board could rely on analysis from a revived Division of 
Economic Research,5 but could also solicit data and guidance from the 
merging parties, Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
 4.  See Naidu et al., supra note 1; Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 1. See also Testimony 
Before House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law (Judiciary Committee),
Hearing Entitled “Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets,” Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement by Doha Mekki) 
[hereinafter Mekki Statement]; “Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws,” Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 20-23 (2018) (statement of Joseph Simons) [hereinafter Simons Statement]; 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., MARKET CONCENTRATION—NOTE BY THE UNITED STATES
(2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)59/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/F28G-
DMLH]. 
 5.  For proposal on repealing ban on Board economist hiring (29 U.S.C. § 154(a)) and re-
establishment of a Division of Economic Research, see Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor 
Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (2017). A repeal has been proposed in the Protecting the Right to 
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Commission (“EEOC”), competitors, employees, and customers of the 
merging parties, and the general public. Finally, the Board could review the 
merging employers’ efficiency defenses and rebuttals under a worker
welfare standard, leaving any consumer welfare concerns to antitrust 
agency review. The Board would be authorized to condition merger 
approval on ensuring robust labor protections for employees of the merged 
firm, including but not limited to establishing a default opt-out union, 
mandatory arbitration leading to a first collective bargaining agreement, or 
other conditions.6
Interagency merger review and “public interest”-based merger 
conditions are not unusual outside of labor markets. In a number of 
industries, regulatory agencies supplement the antitrust agencies’ limited 
product market, consumer welfare-focused review to evaluate broader 
public welfare effects within and beyond that market. Joint merger review 
between the DOJ and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
(telecommunications mergers) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) (electric power mergers) are prominent examples.7 In fact, 
interagency jurisdiction and/or cooperation on merger review spans more 
and less aggressive regulatory agency intervention, including in the 
railroad, banking, shipping, airline, and agricultural industries.8 A common 
thread in interagency review is accommodation of competition law and 
policy with the distinct policy goals of regulatory regimes tasked with 
fulfilling separate statutory mandates and some form of “public interest” 
standard.9 Responsibility for merger review ranges from regulatory 
agencies with exclusive jurisdiction (and the antitrust agencies playing an 
advisory role, like the Surface Transportation Board) to concurrent 
jurisdiction (FCC/FERC) to mandated consultations and advisory roles for 
regulatory agencies.10 Thus, regulatory agencies condition mergers on 
satisfying the “public interest” under their regulatory mandates and involve 
 6.  See infra Part III. 
 7.  See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 214, 310(d) (West 1997); see generally
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (2018); Merger Policy under the Federal Power Act, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 68,595 (1996) (policy statement) [hereinafter FERC MPS]. 
 8.  See infra nn. 67-113 & accompanying text. 
 9.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (directing FCC to determine whether a proposed 
transaction would serve “the public interest, convenience, or necessity”); 16 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) 
(directing FERC to approve mergers only if it finds they would be “consistent with the public interest”); 
49 U.S.C. § 11324(c) (directing STB to approve mergers only if it finds they would be “consistent with 
the public interest”); Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2017) (directing federal banking agencies 
to consider proposed mergers’ probable effect on the public interest); Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 § 3(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2017) (same). 
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data and expertise exchanges on factors exacerbating post-merger effects 
on those mandates. 
A framework of concurrent jurisdiction through regulatory sharing is 
critical for developing a coherent, structural approach to labor market 
regulation that systematically addresses employer buyer power and its 
effects on inequality and constraining workers’ access to economic 
opportunity. And mandating integration of antitrust and labor law 
enforcement in labor markets can aid in dissipating the tension between the 
consumer and worker welfare standards that has historically held back 
labor antitrust enforcement against employers. This Essay is a first step in 
that direction. Part I outlines the current proposals for merger review in 
labor markets and explains their doctrinal, methodological, and regulatory 
limitations. Part II provides an overview of current interagency merger 
review frameworks, drawing from them best practices to apply to 
interagency merger review in labor markets. Finally, Part III proposes and 
defends a framework for concurrent jurisdiction of the antitrust agencies 
and the NLRB in merger reviews. 
I. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR MERGER REVIEW IN LABOR MARKETS
A recent sea change in labor economics has shifted the once-dominant 
view that employer monopsony—or buyer power to reduce labor inputs 
and artificially suppress wages—is unlikely to a view that it is pervasive 
and that labor markets are imperfectly competitive.11 The realities of labor 
market concentration as well as employer collusion and extensive use of 
labor market restraints in employment contracts—with limited ability for 
successful worker challenge—has prompted new commitments and 
proposals from both antitrust agencies and antitrust scholars, expanding 
tools once reserved for ensuring product market competition into labor 
markets. 
A. Antitrust Agencies’ Proposed Review of Mergers’ Labor Market 
Effects 
Antitrust enforcement in labor markets has a long and sordid history 
of targeting worker combinations, collective action, and strikes as unlawful 
 11.  See, e.g., supra note 1; ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION 29-52 (2003); Alan 
Krueger, Reflections on Dwindling Worker Bargaining Power, JACKSON HOLE ECON. SYMPOSIUM 1 
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restraints of trade, focusing on worker “cartels” while ignoring employer 
combinations and cartel activity.12 In the merger context, until very 
recently, enforcement agencies almost exclusively regarded merger’s 
workforce reductions and other adverse labor market effects on workers as 
procompetitive efficiencies, in part due to the rise of the Chicago School as 
the dominant intellectual force behind modern antitrust. In other words, 
they assumed that reduced labor costs were a desirable effect of a merger.13
The anticompetitive effects of mergers that could result from increased 
labor market concentration were at best underenforced and underdiscussed. 
The 1968, 1982, 1984, 1992, and 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines made 
no reference to mergers that enhance market power on the buying side, and 
when consideration of mergers’ buy-side effects was introduced in the 
2010 Guidelines, the antitrust agencies made no mention of whether or how 
to assess such effects in labor markets.14
The antitrust agencies have committed to reviewing the labor market 
effects of proposed mergers when conducting their standard merger review 
just as they have product market effects in the past. Review of a proposed 
merger’s impact on labor market concentration occurs as part of the 
agencies’ merger assessment under Clayton Act, Section 7, the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Amendments, and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.15 The 
standard mechanism of assessing labor market concentration effects would 
begin with applying the same standards to labor input markets as those 
 12.  See, e.g., DANIEL ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR (1995); FELIX FRANKFURTER &
NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust 
Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969 (2016).  
 13.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § V.A (1982) 
(outlining merger defenses based on claims of “specific efficiencies”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3.5 (1984) (listing as “cognizable efficiencies” 
“reductions in general selling, administrative, and overhead expenses”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (1992) (same); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (1997) (stating mergers  generating significant efficiencies 
that “enabl[e] the combined firm to achieve lower costs in production . . . than either firm could have 
achieved without the proposed transaction” as “primary benefit of mergers to the economy”); U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
Guidelines] (stating that “incremental costs reductions may reduce or reverse any increases in the 
merged firm’s incentive to elevate price” and “make coordination less likely or effective by enhancing 
the incentive of a maverick to lower price or by creating a new maverick firm”); DAVID SCHEFFMAN ET 
AL., 20 YEARS OF MERGER GUIDELINES ENFORCEMENT AT THE FTC 47-48 (2002), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/20-years-merger-guidelines-enforcement-ftc-economic-perspective 
[https://perma.cc/CLU8-XDLC] (describing FTC accountants’ role in assessing merger-specific 
efficiencies, including “reviews of labor costs and related union agreements to assess savings related to 
headcount reductions, reviews of labor rates and anticipated reductions”); see also Kevin Caves & Hal 
Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 395 (2019). For FTC’s new 
stance, see Simons Statement, supra note 4.
 14.  See 2010 Guidelines, supra note 13, § 12; Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 540. 
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used on product market effects, deeming labor markets with post-merger 
concentration levels that exceed 2,500 on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) as “highly concentrated” and markets with HHI between 1,500 and 
2,500 to be “moderately concentrated.”16 Mergers that increase the HHI 
level in labor markets by more than 100 points should “raise significant 
competitive concerns” to warrant scrutiny, while those resulting in an 
increase of more than 200 points should “be presumed to be likely to 
enhance market power,” rebuttable by “persuasive evidence showing that 
the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.”17
Enforcement agencies have committed to applying the consumer 
welfare standard to labor market effects but have not been clear on either 
what “consumer welfare” might mean in the labor market setting or how 
they would address circumstances where mergers harm workers but benefit 
consumers. First, the DOJ and FTC stated in their Guidance to Human 
Resource Professionals that while they would consider no employer 
defenses in per se, or “hard core,” wage-fixing and horizontal no-poaching 
cases, they may consider defenses when reviewing employers’ use of non-
compete clauses or information-sharing.18 This suggests that, when non-
”hard-core” activity among employers—such as proposed mergers—is 
reviewed, the agencies will consider efficiencies gained or possibly 
benefits to consumers from labor market restraints.19 In Congressional 
testimony, FTC Chair Joseph Simons stated that the FTC would review 
“potential anticompetitive impacts on labor” when analyzing mergers, but 
failed to specify how those anticompetitive effects would be weighed 
against any merger-specific efficiencies.20 And when asked whether “the 
‘consumer welfare’ standard accounts for labor market concerns,” he 
responded: “Yes. Antitrust enforcement protects the competitive process, 
which benefits consumers, in labor markets as it does for other markets.”21
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division at DOJ, 
Doha Mekki, echoed this equivocation, committing to assess mergers’ 
labor effects under a consumer rather than worker welfare standard: “the 
consumer welfare standard is flexible enough to take into account harm to 
 16.  2010 Guidelines, supra note 13, at § 5.3. For scholarly proposals detailing the application of 
the 2010 Guidelines to labor markets, see Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1058; Naidu et al., 
supra note 2, at 574-91. 
 17.  2010 Guidelines, supra note 13, at § 5.3. 
 18.  ANTITRUST DIV., supra note 2, at 3; Simons Statement, supra note 4, at 35. 
 19.  ANTITRUST DIV., supra note 2, at 4 (describing naked wage-fixing and no-poaching 
agreements as “hardcore cartel conduct”); Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, supra note 1. 
 20.  Simons Statement, supra note 4, at 31 
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competition that is localized in an upstream labor market,” but clarifying 
that, “while there is often a symmetry between upstream and downstream 
harms, the law does not require evidence of harm to competition in a 
downstream product market for liability under Section 7.”22
B. Scholars’ Proposals for Review of Mergers’ Labor Market Effects 
Propelled by evidence of labor market concentration, employers’ labor 
market restraints, and antitrust agency inaction, commentators have 
proposed innovative reforms to the agencies’ assessment of labor market 
effects in their merger review. Professors Eric Posner, Glen Weyl, Suresh 
Naidu, Herbert Hovenkamp, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum 
have incorporated industrial organizations (“IO”) and labor economics 
research and methods—”structural labor economics”23—to theorize and 
empirically analyze employer market power effects on concentration levels 
and workers’ compensation to better inform agencies’ merger review.24
Mirroring the agencies’ own IO approaches to assessing product market 
effects of mergers but instead in labor markets, they model and explain 
how easily integrable their approaches are to current agency practice.25
The IO approach seeks to identify when firms can profitably pay 
workers below their marginal revenue product (“MRP”), or an MRP 
“proxy” wage, recognizing that “real-world” competitive wages “are likely 
to fall below marginal revenue product because of search frictions and job 
differentiation” (since labor markets are naturally monopsonistic).26 An 
assumption of the approach is that, under competitive conditions, the 
market will set wages based on alternative uses for relatively homogeneous 
units of worker productivity and skill; you can expect price differentiation 
assuming relative uniformity of labor inputs only based on firms’ 
acquisition of market power. Market power can be assessed through 
measures of employer concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) or through “downward wage pressure” measures.27 In sum, IO 
 22.  Mekki Statement, supra note 4, at 3. 
 23.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 584. 
 24.  See, e.g., Scott Hemphill & Nancy Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 1742 
(2018); ALAN KRUEGER & ERIC POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM 
MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION (2018), 
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/a_proposal_for_protecting_low_income_workers_from_mono
psony_and_collusion [https://perma.cc/666C-T7YD]. See also supra note 1 (collecting sources).  
 25.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 539, 542, 584. See also Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 1. 
 26.  Marinescu & Posner, Proposal to Enhance, supra note 1, at 13. 
 27.  See generally Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 539, 578-80. For HHI-based analysis, see
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models employers’ ability to suppress wages based on assumptions of how 
profit-maximizing firms would exploit their market position relative to 
others by reducing labor inputs and setting a monopsonistic wage, adopting 
as the ideal benchmark wages at the “competitive” level approximating the 
MRP of labor.28
Scholars have proposed instituting these methods and updating the  
Merger Guidelines “to provide a detailed legal framework, comparable to 
that already provided for product market power, for evaluating the effects 
of a merger on labor markets.”29 Naidu, Posner, and Weyl propose that 
agencies presumptively block mergers that increase labor market 
concentration substantially or exert downward wage pressure below a 
meaningful threshold, absent the merging firms’ demonstration of 
efficiency gains (reducing redundancies, increased productivity) of 
sufficient magnitude to overcome wage decreases and job eliminations.30
Marinescu and Hovenkamp support a broader efficiency defense that the 
merger would lead to the same or greater output with significantly fewer 
workers through labor-saving technology, but also argue that the existence 
of non-compete agreements should be an exacerbating factor on a given 
concentration level’s significance during a merger review.31 These 
proposals to kickstart merger enforcement in labor markets focus 
exclusively on enforcement through the antitrust agencies. 
C. Limitations of Current Approaches to Merger Review in Labor 
Markets 
Current approaches to antitrust merger review of labor market effects 
are fundamentally limited for historical, doctrinal, institutional, and 
expertise-based reasons and as a matter of prophylactic policy. First, as 
previously discussed, the history of antitrust agency practice in labor 
markets has been directed at worker combinations, not employer 
combinations.32 As will be more fully discussed in this Subsection, this 
legacy has impacted not only the doctrinal evolution of antitrust law as a 
common law statute as applied in labor markets, but has also had deeper 
impacts on the institutional culture and expertise of the antitrust agencies. 
note 1, at 38-39; Steinbaum, supra note 1, at 10-12. For the structural model approach, see Naidu et al., 
supra note 1, at 574-95. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 548. 
 30.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 591-92, 594-95. 
 31.  Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 1060. 
 32.  See sources cited supra note 12; Brishen Rogers, The Limits of Antitrust Enforcement, BOS.
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Even though the antitrust agencies have announced a newfound 
commitment to reviewing the labor market effects of mergers, neither 
agency has ever blocked a merger based on an increase in labor market 
concentration.33 While the DOJ has enforced against mergers in part 
because they were likely to create or enhance monopsony power in the 
health care setting, the government and the court focused on the mergers’ 
product market effects.34
Second, there are real doctrinal and institutional limitations to 
exclusively deploying the antitrust laws to protect worker welfare. As of 
now, substantive antitrust doctrine and judicial review standards for 
approving mergers ignore labor market effects, worker welfare, and “public 
interest” considerations in favor of consumer welfare and the antitrust 
agencies’ discretion.35 As a preliminary matter, the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines require that a proposed merger’s benefits exceed its costs in a 
single relevant market when assessing merger-specific efficiencies.36 The 
agencies are required to assess a merger’s market concentration effects in 
“one or more relevant markets in which the merger may substantially 
lessen competition,” including any relevant buy-side or labor market(s).37
But their historical practice of ignoring labor market effects has continued 
even after their declared commitment to Congress to consider such effects, 
as the DOJ’s recent proposed consent decree in the Sprint/T-Mobile merger 
suggests, where the DOJ focused exclusively on product market effects 
without considering labor market effects.38 Even were the antitrust agencies 
solely to challenge a merger for its effects in a relevant labor market alone, 
it remains an open question how the agencies or the courts would balance 
 33.  Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 88 
(2019). 
 34.  United States et al. v. Anthem Inc. et al., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Complaint, United 
States et al. v. Anthem Inc. et al., No. 16-cv-01493 (D.D.C. July 21, 2016) (challenging merger in part 
because merged firm’s potential to suppress reimbursement rates to providers); see also Revised Final 
Judgment, United States et al. v. Aetna Inc. et al., No. 3-99CV 1398-H (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999) 
(imposing conditions on merger due to merged firm’s ability to depress physicians’ reimbursement rates 
in certain markets). 
 35.  See Hafiz, supra note 1, at 8. 
 36.  2010 Guidelines, supra note 13, at § 10. 
 37.  Id. at § 4. 
 38.  Proposed Final J., United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG et al., No. 1:19-cv-02232 (D.D.C. 
July 26, 2019) (failing to incorporate labor market effects analysis or structural remedies in conditional 
approval); Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG et al., No. 1:19-cv-
02232 (D.D.C. July 30, 2019); see also NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES ET AL., ASSESSING DOJ’S PROPOSED 
REMEDY IN SPRINT/T-MOBILE: CAN EX ANTE COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN WIRELESS MARKETS BE
RESTORED? 3 n.13 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3467663 
[https://perma.cc/B4TF-4YAG]. For labor market concentration concerns raised by merger, see Adil 
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harm to workers with benefits to consumers when conducting that review 
based on current doctrine.39 To the extent mergers harms workers but 
benefits consumers—when merger-specific efficiencies outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger to workers—current antitrust doctrine 
favors consumer over worker welfare.40 Current proposals assume 
consumer and worker welfare are aligned because a reduction in inputs 
leads to a reduction in outputs, raising prices to consumers.41 But even 
proponents of additional merger enforcement in labor market acknowledge 
that this assumption does not always hold true. On the contrary, increases 
in monopsony power can harm workers without harming (and sometimes 
even benefiting) consumers. First, prices to consumers will not increase if 
product markets are competitive or a sales’ reduction is offset by new 
firms’ sales.42 Additionally, the alignment calculus assumes employers 
cannot wage discriminate,43 but information asymmetries and workplace 
fissuring allows employers to suppress worker compensation without 
reducing labor inputs by hiring new workers at different pay rates.44 When 
faced with conflicting consumer/worker welfare, antitrust agencies and the 
courts have credited cognizable economic efficiencies where harm to 
workers is outweighed by benefits to consumers.45 For example, courts 
have upheld no-poaching and non-compete agreements executed in 
mergers where employers demonstrated they were conducive to increasing 
 39.  See Hafiz, supra note 1, at 7. 
 40.  For a fuller discussion, see Hafiz, supra note 1. 
 41.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 538, 559; Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 1061-62. 
 42.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 559. See also United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding defendant exercised monopsony power only against supplier film distributors, 
not consumer moviegoers). 
 43.  Naidu et al., supra note 1, at 558 (“[E]mployers cannot practice wage discrimination very 
effectively.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 87-92 (2014); Krueger, supra note 11, at 
4-5; Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service 
Occupations?, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 287 (2010); CALLACI, supra note 1. 
 45.  See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber, 549 U.S. 312, 325 (2007) 
(rejecting the premise that exercising monopsony power necessarily harms downstream consumers as 
well as monopsonist suppliers); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (viewing benefits 
of NCAA marketing sports to downstream consumers as trumping lack of compensation to student-
athletes); Eichhorn v. AT&T, 248 F.3d 131, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding anticompetitive harm of no-
hire agreements outweighed by merger-specific efficiencies); Statement of Interest of the United States, 
Stigar v. Dough Dough, No. 2:18-cv-00244, slip op. at 8-9 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019) (stating no-poach 
provisions between labor-market competitors per se unlawful “unless they are reasonably necessary to
a separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration,” thus allowing procompetitive defenses to 
trump anticompetitive harms); Caremark Rx/AdvancePCS, File No. 031 0239, 2 (F.T.C. Feb. 11, 2004) 
(statement of the F.T.C.), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/02/040211ftcstatement0310239.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PZ4A-NSWC] (arguing that lower input prices passed through to consumers as 
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output, quality control, protecting competitively sensitive information, 
incentivizing training and assistance, and preventing free-riding, 
demonstrating the continued primacy of consumer over worker welfare in 
substantive merger doctrine.46 In doing so, courts have cited a long history 
of judicial recognition “that covenants-not-to-compete are not violations of 
§1” of the Sherman Act.47
Further, current proposals do not contend with the burdensome 
restrictions on intervention in Tunney Act proceedings and the limited 
transparency of agency deliberations and deal-making in consent decrees. 
The lion’s share of DOJ/FTC merger challenges result in negotiated 
settlements; merger policy is effectively agency-administered with limited 
ex ante mechanisms for workers to challenge them outside of Tunney Act 
proceedings which require judicial approval of consent decrees.48 Under 
the Tunney Act, a federal judge can enter a proposed antitrust consent 
decree only if she finds it “in the public interest” after considering “the 
impact of entry of such judgment upon . . . the public generally and 
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the 
complaint.”49 The Act provides for a public right to comment on the 
proposed settlement, and a judge may hold a hearing with testimony from 
“Government officials or experts,” “appoint a special master” or outside 
experts to provide analysis, and allow appearances by “interested persons 
or agencies,” among others, in order to make an informed “public interest 
determination.”50
But while Congress instructed courts in the Tunney Act and 
subsequent amendments to review consent decrees’ comportment with the 
“public interest,” courts have abdicated their role by deferring to the 
Attorney General’s discretion and raising the bar for intervention in 
Tunney Act proceedings.51 Even after Congress imposed more stringent 
 46.  See Hafiz, supra note 1 (collecting cases); Eichhorn, 248 F.3d at 146 (approving no-hire 
arrangement because “primary purpose” was to ensure purchaser retention of employees’ skilled 
services and “workforce continuity”). 
 47.  Eichhorn, 248 F.3d at 145; see also United States v. Empire Gas, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 
1976); Lektro-Vend v. Vendo, 500 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
 48.  Douglas Ginsburg & Joshua Wright, Antitrust Settlements: The Culture of Consent, in 1 
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE 177 (Charbit et al. eds. 2013) (“the [Antitrust] Division 
resolv[es] nearly its entire antitrust civil enforcement docket by consent decree . . . . Since 1995, the 
FTC has settled 93 percent of its competition cases.”); Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New 
Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 14 (1995) (describing antitrust enforcement as moving “from the Law 
Enforcement Model toward the Regulatory Model”); Harry First, Is Antitrust “Law”?, 10 ANTITRUST 9,
9 (1995) (noting “shift on the policy continuum toward bureaucratic regulation”). 
 49.  Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2004).  
 50.  Id. § 16(f). 
 51.  Id. § 16(e)(1). For overview of judicial “rubber-stamping” of DOJ consent decrees, see
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requirements on reviewing courts—mandating consideration of public 
interest factors—not a single court has challenged a consent decree.52 And 
certainly no court has rejected a proposed final judgment on grounds that a 
merger was not in the public interest due to its labor market effects (or an 
antitrust agencies’ failure to address such effects). The only judicial 
opinion addressing labor market effects of a merger in its Tunney Act 
review suggested that it would be improper as a doctrinal matter to assess 
the impacts of a merger on workers as part of the court’s public interest 
review. The case concerned the DOJ’s consent decree with AT&T 
initiating its divestiture into the “Baby Bells.”53 While AT&T negotiated its 
settlement and reorganization with the DOJ, it had also been negotiating 
with the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”), the union 
representing the Bell System’s employees, and had reached a memorandum 
of understanding about protections for employees transferred to the 
separate AT&T subsidiaries and affiliates.54 The CWA submitted briefs as 
part of the Tunney Act proceeding stating its approval for the decree, and 
while the district court cited that favorably in its approval, it made clear 
that the interests of the employees was not within its Tunney Act review: 
The purpose of the divestiture is to establish conditions which will 
prevent the type of anticompetitive activities which the government has 
charged in its complaints . . . . These activities, and hence the settlement 
of the lawsuits, do not involve AT&T’s labor relations and . . . have 
nothing to do with the [CWA] or its relationship with the Bell System.55
The court cited the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Act’s statutory 
exemption of labor from the antitrust laws as supporting the proposition 
that employees impacted by divestiture were not properly a subject of 
consideration in a Tunney Act review.56
Additionally, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act forbids the FTC from 
disclosing merger review documents submitted by merging parties to the 
Darren Bush, The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 750, 777-81 (2003); 
Howard Shelanski & Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
41-43 (2001). Courts only allow intervention in Tunney Act proceedings if movers can “point to 
specific defects . . . or . . . discrepancy between the remedy and substantially undisputed facts so broad 
as to render the decree a ‘mockery of judicial power.’” Massachusetts School of Law v. United States, 
118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This has limited intervention to “exceptionally rare circumstances.” 
Bush, supra note 51, at 120. 
 52.  Bush, supra note 51, at 123-27. See, e.g., United States v. SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2007) (concluding its Tunney Act review was limited). 
 53.  United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 54.  Id. at 210. 
 55.  Id.
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public,57 and agency deployment of the deliberative process privilege and 
the Freedom of Information Act’s deliberative process exemption 
(Exemption 5) block from public disclosure agency merger review 
documents.58 Thus, in addition to the doctrinal challenges presented by 
integrating labor market effects in merger review, worker and union 
participation in, knowledge about, and ability to challenge merger 
approvals before they occur are very limited, and where political pressures 
favor merger approval, will have limited avenues of ensuring 
accountability. 59 While workers can challenge mergers after they occur 
under Section 7, they face considerable obstacles procedurally (arbitration 
clauses, class action certification, costly expert fees) and substantively 
(burden-shifting rule of reason analysis, wealthy counterparties with 
significant resources, judicial reluctance to “unscramble the egg” post-
merger).60 Having robust agency intervention on behalf of workers is a 
critical institutional bulwark to ensure adequate representation of their 
interests in merger review. 
Third, the antitrust agencies have insufficient expertise in labor market 
regulation and labor law enforcement’s role in reinforcing merger policy, 
contributing to long-term labor market health and preempting employer 
buyer power by ensuring employees’ countervailing power. Exclusive 
application of antitrust agencies’ social scientific methods—Industrial 
Organizations (“IO”)—to labor market analysis cannot assess all labor 
market effects of a merger. While IO can predict compensation and 
reduced employment effects, it does not identify broader effects on 
exacerbating labor market failures (search costs, information asymmetries, 
heterogeneous preferences, matching costs, lock-in effects, mobility costs, 
and so on) or behavioral failures (cognitive heuristics hindering workers’ 
risk assessments) that can enhance a merged firm’s buyer power over 
 57.  15 U.S.C. § 18(a). 
 58.  Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018). The privilege pre-existed 
FOIA and has continuing application outside the FOIA context. See N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (finding that the deliberative process privilege protects “advice, 
recommendations, and opinions which are part of the deliberative, consultative, decision-making 
processes of government”). 
 59.  On the impact of political pressures on merger approval, see, for example, Flynn & Bush, 
supra note 51, at 755-57; Editorial Board, Did Trump Intervene in the AT&T Merger to Destroy His 
Enemies? Congress Must Investigate, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-must-investigate-whether-trump-intervened-in-the-
atandt-case/ 2019/03/06/fabeaf60-4038-11e9-a0d3-1210e58a94cf_story.html?arc404=true 
[https://perma.cc/W8SX-W72Z]; Jane Mayer, The Making of the Fox News White House, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/11/the-making-of-the-fox-news-white-
house [https://perma.cc/VA44-K2MH]. 
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workers.61 In addition to IO, broader labor economic, industrial relations, 
and socio-psychological studies of worker productivity are key for 
assessing merger effects on worker productivity and output—IO does not 
incorporate their methodologies or insights in its assessment of merger 
effects.62 Finally, IO-based market power evaluations ignore the role of 
institutions—like labor unions and government workplace interventions—
in the longer-term equalization of worker bargaining power relative to 
employers and as a prophylactic to the rise of employer buyer power.63
Successful merger enforcement ensuring vibrant labor market competition 
would benefit from an interdisciplinary evaluation of merger effects. 
Similarly, the current literature ignores how labor law enforcement—
through an institutional role for the Board, substantive adaptation of labor 
law doctrine to the post-merger setting, and application of expertise-driven 
remedial conditions—could bolster any antitrust conditions or remedies 
and even preempt a merger’s adverse effects. Because unions can serve as 
countervailing power to reduce the effects of employer monopsony,64
establishing a structural role for the Board in merger review will aid in 
developing a stronger and mutually reinforcing system of labor market 
regulation. 
II. INTERAGENCY MERGER REVIEW
Shared jurisdiction over merger review is not uncommon. In fact, 
interagency jurisdiction and/or cooperation on merger review spans the 
spectrum of more and less aggressive intervention by agencies outside the 
DOJ and FTC. This Part provides an overview of three types of interagency 
merger review: independent and exclusive merger review authority in an 
agency outside the DOJ and FTC, with the antitrust agencies playing an 
advisory role; concurrent jurisdiction between the antitrust agencies and an 
outside regulatory agency; and exclusive DOJ or FTC merger review 
jurisdiction with regulatory agencies playing an advisory role. It focuses on 
regulatory agencies’ incorporation of a “public interest” standard and 
 61.  See Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id.
 64.  Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24307, 2018); Suresh Naidu & Noam Yuchtman, Labor Market 
Institutions in the Gilded Age, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22117, 2016). For 
broader analysis of unions’ economic impacts, see RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO
UNIONS DO? (1984) (discussing efficiency-enhancing functions of unions); Barry Hirsch, What Do 
Unions Do for Economic Performance, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE
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policy considerations beyond antitrust policy in the merger review process. 
As a general matter, “public interest” consideration “is not a broad license 
to promote the general public welfare”; rather, “the words take meaning 
from the purposes of the regulatory legislation.”65 This overview reveals 
interagency merger review, while not without its critics, can be an effective 
approach to regulating mergers while balancing competing substantive 
priorities created by the intersection of antitrust and other regulatory 
regimes. 
A. Independent and Exclusive Merger Review Outside the DOJ and 
FTC
One extreme on the interagency merger review spectrum is review 
done within the exclusive jurisdiction of a regulatory agency not otherwise 
tasked with enforcing antitrust law, with the antitrust agencies serving an 
advisory role. This model exists in certain industries that were 
comprehensively regulated by pre-New Deal and New Deal agencies under 
a rate-making model, as in the transportation sector.66 Currently, the 
Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has exclusive jurisdiction over 
railroad mergers.67
While the STB must “accord substantial weight” to any 
recommendations of the Attorney General when considering applications 
for rail mergers, it conducts an independent merger review analysis 
explicitly incorporating a “public interest” standard.68 Under that standard, 
it may only approve a merger after considering the “effect on the public 
interest of including, or failing to include, other rail carriers in the area 
involved in the proposed transaction,”69 and will approve a transaction 
unless it finds that “the anticompetitive effects of the transaction outweigh 
the public interest in meeting significant transportation needs.”70 The 
burden of proof for presenting a prima facie case for Board approval is on 
the merging parties.71 The Board’s “public interest” criteria include “the 
various goals of effective competition, carrier safety and efficiency, 
adequate service for shippers, environmental safeguards, and fair working 
 65.  NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976). 
 66.  See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Interstate Commerce Commission, in OF LAW AND LIFE 235-
44 (Philip Kurland ed., 1965). 
 67.  For STB merger review authority, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 11321-28 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116-68); 49 C.F.R. § 1180 (2019) (STB railroad merger regulations).  
 68.  49 U.S.C. § 11324. 
 69.  49 U.S.C. § 11324(b)(2), (c). 
70. Id. § 11324(d)(2). 
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conditions for employees.”72 And mergers serve the public interest “only 
when substantial and demonstrable gains in important public benefits—
such as improved service and safety, enhanced competition, and greater 
economic efficiency—outweigh any anticompetitive effects, potential 
service disruptions, or other merger-related harms.”73 Beyond just 
weighing the potential benefits and harms of a proposed merger, the STB 
considers the public threat to “essential services and the reliability of the 
rail network,” making special provision for “employee protection” and 
preserving existing collective bargaining agreements with unions: 
The Board is required to provide a fair arrangement for the protection of 
the rail employees of applicants who are affected by a consolidation. The 
Board supports early notice and consultation between management and 
the various unions, leading to negotiated implementing agreements, 
which the Board strongly favors. Otherwise, the Board respects the 
sanctity of collective bargaining agreements and will look with extreme 
disfavor on overrides of collective bargaining agreements except to the 
very limited extent necessary to carry out an approved transaction. The 
Board will review negotiated agreements to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment of all affected employees.74
Thus, the Board balances competing interests, including employees’ 
interests, and the balancing under its public interest test “is entitled to 
considerable deference” because “determining whether to approve a carrier 
consolidation is a complex task requiring considerable knowledge of the 
transportation industry.”75
B. Agencies’ Concurrent Jurisdiction with DOJ/FTC Merger Review 
Another form of interagency merger review is concurrent jurisdiction. 
The FCC and FERC share joint jurisdiction with the DOJ over certain 
mergers in the media and telecommunications industry and in the natural 
gas and electric utility markets, respectively.76 When agencies have 
concurrent jurisdiction, either agency can essentially block a merger based 
on its independent analysis. 
The FCC has concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ under Sections 7 
and 11 of the Clayton Act and the Communications Act of 1934 to review 
mergers of common carriers where their effect “may be substantially to 
 72.  Id. § 1180.1(b) (emphasis added). 
 73.  Id. § 1180.1(c). 
 74.  Id. § 1180.1(c), (e).  
 75.  W. Coal Traffic League v. Surface Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 775, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 
McLean Trucking v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944)). 
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lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”77 The FCC’s review is 
initiated by the merging parties’ application filing to transfer ownership of 
FCC licenses, triggering an opportunity for interested parties to submit 
comments and replies to comments.78 After an initial screening, the FCC 
may request additional information and documents from the parties, 
comparable to the DOJ’s process of requesting additional materials as 
“Second Requests.”79 All materials submitted to the FCC are “on the 
record,” but commercially sensitive and proprietary materials may be 
subject to a protective order.80 While the DOJ bears the burden of showing 
the merger’s increase in market concentration and the burden of persuasion 
on the merger’s anticompetitive effects, the merging parties seeking FCC 
approval bear the burden of demonstrating that the license transfer will not 
“substantially lessen competition” and satisfies “the public interest, 
convenience and necessity.”81 The FCC’s merger review is independent 
from the DOJ’s and does not require any formal cooperation, but the 
agencies do form a joint “Transaction Team” to coordinate internal 
procedures for processing merger applications.82
The FCC considers four factors in applying its public interest review, 
namely, whether: (1) the transaction would result in a violation of the 
Communications Act or other applicable statutory provisions; (2) the 
transaction would result in a violation of FCC rules; (3) the transaction 
would substantially frustrate or impair the FCC’s implementation or 
enforcement of the Communications Act, or would interfere with the 
objectives of that and other statutes; and (4) the merger promises to yield 
affirmative public interest benefits.83 The FCC’s review also involves an 
assessment of how the merger will affect its ability to regulate within its 
delegated authority, including its ability to promote “access to advanced 
telecommunications and information services . . . in all regions of the 
Nation” and preserve “the quality of telecommunications services,” 
including “the provision of new or additional services to consumers.”84 In 
 77.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 18, 21(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-68). 
 78.  47 U.S.C.A. §§ 214, 310(d) (West 1997); 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.03-63.04 (2002). 
 79.  See  47 C.F.R. §§ 1.311-.325.
 80.  47 U.S.C.A. § 154(j); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289-94 (1965). 
 81.  47 U.S.C.A. §§ 214, 310; FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 82.  47 U.S.C.A. §§ 214(a), 310(d). See Issues Memorandum for March 1, 2000 Transaction 
Team Public Forum on Streamlining FCC Review of Applications Relating to Mergers, FCC, 
https://www.fcc.gov/issues-memorandum-march-1-2000-transactions-team-public-forum-streamlining-
fcc-review-applications [https://perma.cc/9W5P-NBL5]. 
 83.  See, e.g., Ameritech Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 14,712, 14,737-38 ¶ 48 (1999). 
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evaluating these factors, the FCC’s competitive analysis need not be 
limited to traditional antitrust principles, even if it may be informed by 
them and borrows from the DOJ’s Merger Guidelines.85 Instead, the FCC’s 
authority involves a separate and distinct duty from that of the antitrust 
agencies to weigh any findings and conclusions related to “pertinent 
antitrust policies” “with other important public interest considerations.”86
For example, in the broadcast licensing context, the FCC has considered 
local ownership, diversity of ownership, proposed programming, broadcast 
experience, the character and financial status of the applicants, and whether 
there would be a concentration of media control.87 And the FCC’s 
competitive effects analysis has been broader than the DOJ’s in its focus on 
potential competition and the reduction of carriers that “can act as 
‘benchmarks’ for evaluating the conduct of other carriers or the industry as 
a whole.”88 Mergers that limit comparative benchmarking by reducing 
comparator firms can frustrate the agency’s ability to calculate 
anticompetitive harms and challenge its industry-wide data-gathering and 
monitoring ability.89 Thus, the FCC has considered in its review the 
merger’s impact on reducing the quality of “comparisons of regulatory and 
market performance between” companies.90 In doing its assessment, it has 
a preference for “competitive processes and outcomes.”91 The FCC’s 
public interest determination is judicially reviewable, on the public record, 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act “with regard to all 
applications for transfer or assignment of licenses.”92
The FCC’s most significant impact on mergers is not on blocking 
them—it has only done so in rare cases—but rather on imposing conditions 
and remedial schemes to meet its public interest standard, including 
divestiture and other structural and behavioral remedies.93 For example, it 
has conditioned approval of license transfer on: distribution of detailed 
monitoring reports on ordering, repair, maintenance, network performance, 
 85.  Ameritech Corp., 14 F.C.C. 14,712, 14,738 ¶ 49 n.121; NYNEX Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,008 
¶ 37. The FCC may not “subordinate the public interest to the interest of ‘equalizing competition among 
competitors.’” Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 86.  United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 87.  See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 73, 78-79 (1982). 
 88.  NYNEX Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,058 ¶ 147; Rachel Barkow & Peter Huber, A Tale of Two 
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 45-46 (2000). 
 89.  NYNEX Corp., 12 F.C.C.R. at 20,060-61 ¶ 152. 
 90.  Id. at 20,069 ¶ 177. 
 91.  Tele-Communications, Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3169 ¶ 14 (1999) (“AT&T/TCI”). 
 92.  Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,668, 22,700 (2001). 
 93.  See, e.g., Philip Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual 
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and other information to competitors and government actors; pledges to 
expand into new markets or face damages; discount offers to competitors 
and charge waivers to residential customers; provision of elements of its 
network to competitors based on “forward-looking economic costs”; 
development of special arbitration regimes to ensure that cable companies 
continue to receive reasonable access to programming; and continued 
oversight to ensure harmonization and consistent enforcement within its 
general regulatory regime.94
FERC also has concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ in reviewing 
mergers under the Federal Power Act.95 FERC’s public interest standard 
also does not require it “to analyze proposed mergers under the same 
standards that the [DOJ] . . . may apply” because it is not required to “serve 
as an enforcer of antitrust policy in conjunction” with the DOJ or FTC.96
Thus, while it “must include antitrust considerations in its public interest 
calculus . . . it is not bound to use antitrust principles when they may be 
inconsistent with the [agency’s] regulatory goals.”97 FERC’s 1996 Merger 
Policy Statement laid out three factors that form the basis of its review: 
“post-merger market power must be within acceptable thresholds or be 
satisfactorily mitigated, acceptable customer protections must be in place, 
and any adverse effect on regulation must be addressed”; beyond those 
broad factors, FERC has avoided any rule-based approach of the “public 
interest” in favor of highly flexible standards.98 Similar to the FCC, FERC 
leans heavily on the DOJ/FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines; it uses 
them as a “screen” for horizontal market power and requires applicants to 
define geographic and product markets, offer a “delivered price test” to 
identify potential suppliers to those markets, and uses the HHI to measure 
supplier concentration.99 Passing the screen creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the merger will result in market power, but if the 
applicants fail the screen, FERC conducts a more “detailed analysis,” 
which includes trial-type hearings at which applicants produce evidence 
showing their transaction is consistent with the public interest.100 If FERC 
finds an “adverse effect” on competition, and if other factors do not 
 94.  NYNEX, 12 F.C.C.R. at 19,988 ¶ 4, 19,992 ¶ 3; Ameritech Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. at 14,964, 
App. C (listing all conditions); Weiser, supra note 93, at 194. 
 95.  16 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(1)-(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-72). See generally Lawrence 
Spiwak, Expanding the FERC’s Jurisdiction to Review Utility Mergers, 15 ENERGY L.J. 385 (1993). 
 96.  Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 947-48 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 97.  Id.
 98.  Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy under the Federal Power Act: Policy 
Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (Dec. 30, 1996). 
 99.  Id. at 68,601. 
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“mitigate or counterbalance” those effects, FERC may impose remedies 
like forming “an Independent System Operator, divestiture of assets, 
elimination of transmission constraints, efficient regional transmission 
pricing, and . . . an open season to allow the merging utilities’ customers to 
escape from their contracts.”101 Applicants who fail the screen can avoid 
mitigation if they show their proposed transaction is consistent with the 
public interest under four factors: (1) the potential adverse competitive 
effects of the merger; (2) whether entry by competitors can deter 
anticompetitive behavior or counteract adverse competitive effects; (3) the 
effects of efficiencies that could not be realized absent the merger; and (4) 
whether one or both of the merging firms is failing and, absent the merger, 
the failing firm’s assets would exit the market.102 However, the Supreme 
Court has held that employee job concerns do not fall within the scope of 
FERC’s “public interest” inquiry to ensure “just and reasonable rates.”103
C. Agencies’ Joint Review of and Guidance to DOJ or FTC Merger 
Review 
A third model of interagency merger review is coordinated review 
between the antitrust and regulatory agencies and, depending on the 
delegating statute, involves a sliding scale of authority granted to the 
antitrust agencies relative to the regulatory agencies. For example, in the 
banking industry, bank and bank holding company mergers are highly 
regulated under the Bank Merger Act with merger review independently 
conducted by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division but coordinated with the 
merging banks’ relevant federal regulator—the Federal Reserve, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency—depending on the nature of the bank and transaction.104
Banking agencies are prohibited from approving transactions they find 
anticompetitive, and while they must request “reports on the [merger’s] 
competitive factors” from the DOJ before making determinations, they 
need not accept the DOJ’s recommendations.105 The banking agency may 
approve the merger if it finds that “the anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
 101.  Id. at 68,601. 
 102.  Id. at 68,596. 
 103.  NAACP, 425 U.S. at 670. 
 104.  See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511-84, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 1841); Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018); see also Robert Kramer, 
Antitrust Review in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 111, 115-17 (2002) (collecting 
cases). 
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probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of 
the community served.”106 The responsible agency must consider “the 
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and 
proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community to 
be served.”107 The burden of establishing this “convenience and needs” 
defense is on the merging banks.108 The DOJ then has authority to 
challenge banking agency-approved mergers using the same standard used 
by the banking agency, meaning that the standard the DOJ applies must 
include the same public interest considerations that the banking agencies 
consider and weigh.109
While the DOJ has exclusive jurisdiction to review mergers in the 
shipping and airline industry, the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) 
reviews rate agreements between carriers and shippers, can grant limited 
antitrust immunity for filed ocean common carrier agreements if the 
immunity “will not result in substantial reduction in competition or be 
detrimental to commerce,” and can attach conditions to exemptions or 
revoke them.110 Further, the FMC monitors the competitive impact and 
commercial conditions of agreements under “reasonableness” thresholds: 
whether the agreements are likely, by a reduction in competition, to 
produce an unreasonable increase in transportation cost or an unreasonable 
reduction in transportation service.111 The FMC can also seek injunctive 
relief against regulated entities that “substantially lessen competition in the 
purchasing of certain covered services” under the Shipping Act.112 Also, in 
domestic airline acquisitions and mergers, the Department of 
Transportation “conducts its own competitive analysis of mergers and 
submits its views in confidence” to the DOJ, and the DOJ calls on the 
Department of Agriculture to weigh in on mergers and acquisitions in the 
agricultural industry.113
 106.  Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B). 
 107.  Id. § 1828(c). 
 108.  Id. § 1828(c)(5). 
 109.  Id. § 1828(c)(7)(B)-(C). 
 110.  Shipping Act of 1984, as amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA), 46 
U.S.C. §§ 40301-07 (Westlaw through P. L. No. 116-68); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. FMC, 503 F.2d 
157 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
 111.  46 U.S.C. § 41307(b)(1) (2006). 
 112.  Id. § 41307(b). 
 113.  See, e.g., Mergers and Acquisitions, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP.,
www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/competition-data-analysis/mergers-acquisitions (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7FTM-NV8F]. Before the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 
the Civil Aeronautics Board had exclusive jurisdiction to review airline mergers under a broader 
“public interest” standard. 49 U.S.C. § 488(b) (1940). For DOJ/FTC-USDA collaboration, see, for 
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D. Criticisms of Interagency Review 
Criticisms of interagency merger review have focused primarily on the 
DOJ’s concurrent with the FCC and FERC. Those criticisms offer guidance 
on what to avoid when extending interagency regulation of mergers in 
labor markets. For the most part, critics have focused on: the “double veto” 
and the costs of duplicative review, delay, and uncertainty (including 
intangible costs like deferring investments, important strategic decisions, 
attracting and retaining personnel, discouraging customers and vendors 
from dealing, and increasing the costs of financing); the failure of the 
regulatory agencies to follow “the judicial body of anticompetition 
review”; application of vague “public interest” standards and alternative 
competitive harms; and regulatory agency use of the merger review process 
to engage in policy-making beyond merger-specific concerns and outside 
traditional administrative requirements of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.114 Scholars and practitioners have also targeted agency power 
to withhold or delay approvals as enabling them to impose coerced and 
burdensome conditions in consent decrees that are effectively insulated 
from judicial review and public participation.115 Further, some argue that 
FERC has been too lax in its public interest analysis, ignoring the 
cumulative effect of mergers in wholesale and retail markets, the 
relationship of purchase price to real transaction value and financial risks 
associated with acquisition debt, the transaction value contributed by the 
target’s ratepayers, and obstacles to aligning the merged entity’s 
performance with the public interest.116
***
In sum, the role of regulatory agencies outside the antitrust agencies is 
prevalent in merger review, allowing regulators to bring their expertise 
about the merging firms’ industry and broader expertise in fulfilling 
competing statutory mandates to bear on assessing and preventing the 
adverse effects of market concentration. Thus, not only must mergers 
RELATED MATTERS (2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/231337.pdf [https://perma.cc/592F-
GU7T]. 
 114.  See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 93, at 169-72; Donald Russell & Sherri Lynn Wolson, Dual
Antitrust Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 150-54 (2002); Barkow & 
Huber, supra note 88, at 67-81; William Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the 
FCC, 38 EMORY L.J. 715, 754 (1989); Telecommunications, Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. at 3238 (Furchtgott-
Roth, Comm’r, concurring). 
 115.  See, e.g., Russell & Wolson, supra note 114, at 154; Barkow & Huber, supra note 88, at 63, 
69, 73; Weiser, supra note 93, at 170. 
 116.  See, e.g., Scott Hempling, Inconsistent with the Public Interest: FERC’s Three Decades of 
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accord with the “public interest” as agencies understand it through the lens 
of their specific policy mandates, but they often invite direct agency 
involvement in approval conditions and remedial mechanisms that position 
regulatory agencies as key institutional actors in firms’ post-merger regime. 
III. INTERAGENCY MERGER REVIEW IN LABOR MARKETS
To ensure a structural approach to labor market regulation, the NLRB 
should share concurrent jurisdiction over mergers that increase labor 
market concentration. Specifically, if the antitrust agencies identify and 
categorize post-merger labor market concentration levels as “moderately” 
or “highly concentrated” in their Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-approval 
screenings, that would trigger NLRB concurrent jurisdiction and 
independent Board sign-off would be required for the merger to proceed. 
The Board is the best agency to conduct joint merger review because of its 
role in ensuring workers’ countervailing power against employers—the 
most natural antidote to employer buyer power when labor market 
concentration levels increase.117 Drawing lessons from the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing interagency merger review, Congress should amend 
the labor law to repeal the ban on Board hiring of economists and establish 
a new Division of Economic Research that would oversee the Board’s 
newly-granted merger review authority.118
The Board’s merger review could track the FCC’s, with some 
improvements to avoid pitfalls of unpredictably broad discretion and the 
“double veto.” Merging parties would file an initial application for 
approval, and the Board would announce its acceptance through public 
notice, issuing notice of a schedule for accepting comments and 
oppositions. The Board and the antitrust agencies could develop a 
symbiotic relationship involving information-sharing from the earliest 
stages of merger review. First, the agencies could establish a joint 
“Transaction Team” to ensure transparent and uniform internal procedures 
for processing applications. The Team would detail staff and facilitate 
information-sharing about projections of labor market effects to both 
agencies, lending mutual expertise and assistance in reviewing merging 
 117.  See generally note 64 and accompanying text. 
 118.  For proposal on repealing ban on Board economist hiring (29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (Westlaw 
through P.L. No. 116-68)) and re-establishment of a Division of Economic Research, see Hiba Hafiz, 
Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (2017). The Protecting the Right to 
Organize (PRO) Act of 2019 advances such a repeal. H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2019). While mandatory 
Board merger approval would require congressional intervention, significant information-sharing and 
consultation could occur without such intervention through establishing Memoranda of Understanding 
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parties’ production and evaluation.119 In addition to integrating labor 
agency expertise into labor antitrust enforcement, the Board could benefit 
from antitrust agencies’ information and certified findings regarding 
market concentration in its assessment of labor market conditions in 
problematic industries and could create a feedback loop alerting the 
antitrust agencies to concentration concerns that may not emerge from their 
merger enforcement. The Board could also coordinate with the DOJ and 
FTC on Merger Guidelines revisions to disclose how labor market effects 
will be assessed during merger reviews. 
To avoid transparency concerns raised in other interagency review 
contexts, the Board could mirror the DOJ’s merger review process and 
require document production from both merging parties and from the 
parties’ competitors, customers, and employees in order to evaluate 
competitive conditions in the market.120 Interested parties could participate 
in robust, on-the-record hearings, commenting on proposed merger plans, 
and any Board approval or conditions would be required to respond to 
significant comments submitted by the public.121 Broad public participation 
and agency response requirements would be a mechanism for instituting 
“policymaking as power-building” in labor market regulation, allowing 
adoption of “institutional design strategies that can be employed to reform 
administrative processes to proactively address disparities of power and 
influence.”122 To avoid delays, the Board could be required to complete its 
review and issue an order within 180 days of accepting the application for 
filing. 
The NLRB is uniquely situated to assess labor-market merger effects 
because of its labor-management relations expertise and extensive industry-
specific labor market data, including information about key indicators of 
labor market power like unionization rates, prevalence of labor law 
violations, the history of union organizing, and expert analysis of the 
treasure trove of filed collective bargaining agreements with terms 
suggestive of management and labor’s respective bargaining leverage.123
 119.  See The Effects of Consolidation on the State of Competition in the Telecommunications 
Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 21 (1998) (statement of Joel 
Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 120.  15 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (1980). 
 121.  See, e.g., Del. Dep’t of Nat. Reserve & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (requiring agency response to public comments be sufficient to enable courts “to see what major 
issues of policy were ventilated . . . and why the agency reacted to them as it did”). 
 122.  K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 322 
(2018). 
 123.  The Taft-Hartley Act directs the Department of Labor to collect collective bargaining 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 35 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
3 HAFIZ MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020 11:54 AM 
62 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
The NLRB could thus provide critical data on and analysis of exacerbating 
factors that may affect the significance of a given labor market 
concentration level.124 These could include data and analysis within the 
relevant labor market of: industry-wide wage rates, including any changes 
resulting from prior mergers; the use of non-competition or non-solicitation 
clauses within the industry; the existence of salary transparency provisions 
in existing collective bargaining agreements in the industry; contractual 
restrictions on wage transparency; internal and external labor market 
statistics (firm reliance on employees or contracted-for labor inputs through 
subcontracting, temporary agencies, and independent contractors and 
assessment of any wage discrimination); and the use of class action waivers 
in employment contracts. 
The Board could also serve as a centralized hub for data, information, 
and reporting from labor-related agencies under existing Memoranda of 
Understanding.125 Information sharing with the Department of Labor and 
EEOC could aid the Board’s analysis of mergers’ labor market effects by 
providing raw data and agency reports on merging parties’ and industry-
wide wage-and-hour violations, violations of health and safety standards, 
violations of anti-discrimination law, and more. Existing Memorandum of 
Understanding with immigration enforcement agencies could provide 
information about parties’ unlawful hiring of undocumented immigrants, 
the history of wage violations against temporary work visa grantees, and 
the history of  discrimination actions for failure to properly solicit and 
recruit qualified U.S. applicants.126 The Board could further solicit data and 
guidance from the Federal Reserve and the IRS regarding both 
macroeconomic data and employee/independent contractor tax filings to 
better assess the labor market landscape and labor’s share of income. All of 
this information would be critical for revealing the employers’ ability to 
profitably engage in conduct that impacts workers’ wages, working 
conditions, and outside options without workers quitting. Thus, joint-
L. No. 116-68). They are collected at the Office of Labor-Management Standards. 72 Fed. Reg. 26159-
62 (2007). 
 124.  The 2010 Guidelines already list factors that impact the significance of concentration levels, 
including price discrimination effects (§3), product differentiation (§6.3), excess capacity (§6.3), the 
presence of powerful buyers (§8), barriers to entry (§9), and more. 
 125.  See Mem. of Understanding, Wage and Hour Div. & NLRB (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/federal/NLRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/96WD-Z5CP]; Mem. of Understanding, 
NLRB & EEOC (EEOC Nov. 16, 1993), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/eeoc-nlrb-ada.html 
[https://perma.cc/L6KS-7YBW]. 
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agency jurisdiction and coordination would more accurately assess the 
impacts of post-merger concentration through more informed analysis of a 
merger’s deeper labor market effects. 
Much like other interagency reviews, NLRB approval under its 
“public interest” standard would tolerate differences from antitrust agency 
standards.127 The Board would assess whether the proposed merger accords 
with the NLRA’s statutory purposes and agency rules by substantially 
frustrating or impairing the objectives or implementation of the labor law, 
including ensuring equal bargaining power between employers and 
employees.128 Approval would be based on its assessment of whether 
potential public interest benefits outweigh public interest harms.129 Like the 
STB, the  Board could condition approval on protections for applicants’ 
employees affected by the consolidation, alerting applicants that it 
“supports early notice and consultation” between management and workers 
or unions that lead to  “negotiated implementing agreements.”130 It could 
also clearly express its respect for “the sanctity of collective bargaining 
agreements,” that it would look with “extreme disfavor” on overrides of 
those agreements, and that it would review negotiated agreements “to 
ensure fair and equitable treatment of all affected employees.”131 The 
Board’s discretion could also be statutorily prescribed by specifying factors 
it would weigh, such as the merger’s impact on: downward wage pressure 
on productivity-maximizing wages; labor’s share of income; worker 
mobility; underemployment, misemployment, and unemployment rates; 
union density rates; and other considerations. To overcome criticisms about 
vague and unpredictable standards, the Board could refine these factors 
through regulations, much like FERC, or through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.132
The Board would focus on worker welfare effects in reviewing 
merging parties’ efficiency defenses and rebuttals. In doing so, the Board 
would incorporate the expertise of labor economists, behavioral 
economists, sociologists of work, human resources, and psychological 
experts to compare estimated post-merger compensation with: internal 
labor market wages and life-cycle earnings within a firm; union premiums 
 127.  See supra Part II. 
 128.  29 U.S.C.A. § 151. 
 129.  For FCC analogs, see, for example, In re AT&T Inc. and DIRECTV, 30 F.C.C.R. 9131, 
9139–40, ¶ 18 (2015); In re Softbank Corp., Starburst II, Inc., Sprint Nextel Corporation, and Clearwire 
Corporation, 28 F.C.C.R. 9642, 9650–51, ¶ 23 (2013). 
 130.  49 C.F.R. § 1180.1(b) (2010). 
 131.  Id. § 1180.1(e). 
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within the industry; fairness expectations and potential effects on 
productivity; merger-specific workplace realities and productivity effects; 
and industry-specific revenue-sharing arrangements in collective 
bargaining agreements. These data and analysis would be integrated into 
evaluations of post-merger effects on workers’ bargaining leverage as 
against their merged employer.133 Finally, macroeconomic experts—
whether internal to the Board, reporting from other labor agencies, or 
solicited as expert witnesses—could estimate the impact of post-merger 
concentration on labor’s share of income within the relevant sector. As 
with other interagency review, the Board could shift burden-of-proof 
requirements: while the DOJ would bear the burden of establishing why a 
merger would be blocked,134  the merging parties would bear the burden of 
establishing why the Board should approve a merger.135
Finally, much like the FCC and FERC, the NLRB could condition 
mergers on appropriate remedies to meet a public interest standard, 
including divestiture and other structural or behavioral remedies.136 Those 
could include: an opt-out union; establishing card-check or rapid elections 
for union recognition; arbitration procedures for a first contract;137
requiring oversight and detailed monitoring reports on hiring and 
terminations data, wage structures, outsourcing and subcontracting 
decisions; pledges to expand into new labor markets or face damages;138
and banning non-compete and class action waiver provisions in 
employment contracts. 
The Board’s concurrent jurisdiction in merger review is preferable to 
it merely serving an advisory role for a number of reasons. First, as argued 
infra, the antitrust agencies’ exclusive jurisdiction over merger reviews in 
labor markets has failed or is limited for historical, doctrinal, institutional, 
and expertise-based reasons, so an advisory role would either be 
insufficient or ineffective.139 And there would unlikely be robust judicial 
review of their failure to incorporate labor market effects in any consent 
decree—the almost exclusive mechanisms for resolving challenged 
 133.  For buy-side harms on bargaining leverage, see Hemphill & Rose, supra note 25, at 2080-82, 
2093-2105. 
 134.  See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 135.  The Communications Act places the burden on applicants in FCC merger proceedings to 
prove by a preponderance that the proposed merger would serve the “public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.” 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). 
 136.  See, e.g., FERC MPS, supra note 8, at 68,610. 
 137.  For a parallel in the FCC setting, see News Corporation Limited, 19 F.C.C.R. 473, 679, 682 
App. F(III), (IV) (2004). 
 138.  Weiser, supra note 93, at 194. 
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mergers—because the courts’ Tunney Act review has and continues to 
function as a rubber stamp granting significant deference to the Attorney 
General while also limiting workers’ ability to intervene.140 The public 
would not likely be able to hold the DOJ and FTC’s feet to the fire because 
merger review negotiations do not occur nor are available in the public 
record.141 A statutory amendment to the antitrust laws requiring the 
antitrust agencies to consider labor market effects in merger reviews would 
not resolve the agencies’ consistent and longstanding favoring of consumer 
over worker welfare; the weight of judge-made antitrust doctrine has 
reinforced this.142 And courts have also demonstrated their favoring of 
consumers over workers in antitrust challenges under the non-statutory 
antitrust exemption that explicitly requires balancing antitrust and labor 
policy.143
Finally, if antitrust agencies fail to consider labor market effects and 
reach a consent decree, workers impacted by the merger would face 
significant costs in an ex post merger challenge.144 Formalizing a system 
with the Board for concurrently developing labor market merger remedies 
would prevent the antitrust agencies from “becoming shadow regulators 
and, at the same time, empower the regulatory agencies to harmonize 
merger remedies with industry regulation.”145 And while the antitrust 
agencies may “develop competence or hire a highly qualified special 
monitor . . . , the agencies lack the economies of scope and scale enjoyed 
by the regulatory body.”146 The Board is certainly more expert at 
understanding how the rapid changes in workplace structures (and 
restructuring) affect workers’ labor rights, and just like in the context of 
dynamic technological change in the telecommunications industry, relying 
exclusively on the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines as “the only 
guidepost for reviewing industry transactions could force merger review 
processes to rely solely upon a rigid, static view of industry structure.”147
For all these reasons, having an institutional and mandatory role for the 
Board in merger reviews is necessary. 
 140.  See note 51 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See note 58 and accompanying text. 
 142.  See Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, supra note 1. 
 143.  See id.
 144.  See note 60 and accompanying text. 
 145.  Weiser, supra note 93, at 197. 
 146.  Id. at 196. 
 147.  Thomas Koutsky & Lawrence Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC Merger 
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CONCLUSION
While the rise of labor antitrust has called significant and timely 
attention to how American labor markets have been failing workers, 
limiting their access to economic mobility, and exacerbating economic 
inequality, administering labor market fixes through antitrust law and the 
antitrust agencies alone is an insufficient remedy. This Essay outlines a 
structural solution to challenging labor market concentration at its 
incipiency by incorporating the National Labor Relations Board—the labor 
agency tasked with ensuring equal bargaining power between employees 
and employers—as joint regulators in the merger review process. 
Concurrent jurisdiction could not only make national labor market 
regulation more coherent, but it could also ensure the strengthening of 
interagency expertise and a more substantial role for the Board in 
effectuating labor protections in the era of corporate consolidation. 
